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Policy makers in Alabama have been engaged in discussions for almost
three decades' about how Alabama's water law should be improved. But no
significant changes have been made in the way the State manages its water
resources.2 A persistent theme in the hesitation to adopt water-policy
legislation is that we require more study of our water resources before we
can take action.3
Our water-policy problems, however, have very little to do with the
nature of our water resources and everything to do with our legal regime.
And the problems with our legal regime are clear and easily understood:
Alabama uses nineteenth-century common law to govern its water
resources, and that common law is inadequate to deal with twenty-first-
century water uses.4 The common law that governs Alabama's surface
water-riparian doctrine-prohibits uses of water off riparian tracts of
land, rendering unlawful many existing diversions of water that serve
municipal, agricultural, commercial, and industrial purposes.5 The common
law that governs Alabama's groundwater-the "American reasonable use
rule"-is almost as restrictive, prohibiting export of groundwater that
would harm overlying landowners.6 Both doctrines also render legal uses of
water uncertain: riparian landowners are always vulnerable to lawsuits
arguing that existing uses have become unreasonable, and American
reasonable use doctrine provides no rule to resolve competing uses among
overlying landowners, leaving such owners to compete with their neighbors
for who can dig the deepest well.
These legal problems are unaffected by assessments of our water
resources: regardless of the answers to questions such as how much surface
and groundwater we have, how much water is currently or could be
diverted from our rivers and streams, and how much water is currently or
could be pumped from our aquifers, these legal problems exist and render
unlawful many existing uses of water.8 These problems also inhibit
1. Current efforts to improve Alabama water policy arguably began in 1989, when Governor Guy
Hunt created the Alabama Water Resources Study Commission. THE ALA. WATER RES. STUDY
COMM'N, WATER FOR A QUALITY OF LIFE: AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (1990) [hereinafter WATER FOR
A QUALITY OF LIFE].
2. See infra notes 102-114, 129-133 and accompanying text.
3. E.g., ALA. WATER AGENCIES WORKING GRP., MAPPING THE FUTURE OF ALABAMA WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2014) [hereinafter MAPPING
THE FUTURE].
4. See infra notes 31-163 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 41-114 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 115-133 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 93-97, 125-127 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 213-223 and accompanying text.
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Alabama's efforts to create economic growth,
9 deal with increasing
population,'o protect the state's world-class environmental resources," and
address the consequences of drought in a changing climate.1
2 And adopting
a legislative solution to those problems likewise does not depend on
assessments of water quantities and uses: while such assessments would be
essential information for day-to-day management of Alabama's water
resources, such information is far too detailed to have any meaningful
effect on the content of a statute that would remedy the problems caused by
current common law.13
All this might not matter if delay were costless. But our ongoing failure
to regulate our water resources has significant direct and collateral
consequences. Alabama's current common law regime directly inhibits
industrial and agricultural activity because economic actors must make
investment decisions without any certainty as to the availability of water.'
4
Those who are using water sensibly but unlawfully under the current
common law regime are vulnerable to lawsuits challenging those uses.
Collaterally, our failure to regulate may harm our interests, primarily in
interstate litigation over water resources. State-versus-state litigation is
heard by the United States Supreme Court.1
6 The Court exercises its
jurisdiction over state-versus-state disputes "sparingly"
7 and refuses to
help states whose water problems are caused by "lax administration."'
8 All
but one of Alabama's neighbors have adopted comprehensive statutes to
9. MAPPING THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at 10.
10. E.g., id. at 13.
11. E.g., R. SCOT DUNCAN, SOUTHERN WONDER: ALABAMA'S SURPRISING BIODIVERSITY
(2013).
12. E.g., SUJOY B. ROY ET AL., EVALUATING SUSTAINABILITY OF PROJECTED WATER DEMANDS
UNDER FUTURE CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS (2010).
13. E.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Basics of the Regulatory Process,
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/basics-regulatory-process (last visited March 2, 2017) ("Laws
often do not include all the details needed to explain how an individual, business, state or local
government, or others might follow the law. The United States Code would not tell you, for example,
what the speed limit is in front of your house. In order to make the laws work on a day-to-day level,
Congress authorizes certain government agencies - including EPA - to create regulations.").
14. See infra note 140-147 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 54-64, 117 and accompanying text.
16. While water conflicts can be resolved in the lower courts, see, e.g., In re Tri-State Water
Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2009), rev'd and vacated sub nom. In re MDL-1824 Tri-
State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2011), any lawsuit by one state against another must
begin and end in the United States Supreme Court, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(2012).
17. United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 538 (1973); see also New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296, 309 (1921) ("Before this court can be moved to exercise its extraordinary power under the
Constitution to control the conduct of one state at the suit of another, the threatened invasion of rights
must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.").
18. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 321 (1984).
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regulate their water resources while Alabama has not,9 putting us at a
disadvantage in interstate litigation. Indeed, both Georgia and Florida have
accused each other of such failings in their current Supreme Court case
involving the Apalachicola-Flint-Chattahoochee basin,20 and Florida has
apparently lost that case - or it will if the Supreme Court affirms the
Special Master's report.2 '
Some have argued that a second collateral effect arises from our failure
adequately to regulate our water resources: that, because of those failings,
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may invade our
22state's control of our rivers and streams. It is true that EPA has been
asked to take over our water-quality permitting program, given the lack of
funds provided to and according lack of regulatory enforcement provided
by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management.2 3 But EPA has
declined those invitations.2 4 Moreover, the Clean Water Act expressly
preserves state power over water allocation.25 Thus, as discussed in more
19. While Tennessee, like Alabama, still largely uses the common law to resolve water resources
disputes, MARY R. ENGLISH & ROY ARTHUR, STATEWIDE WATER RESOURCES PLANNING: A NINE-
STATE STUDY 2 (Tennessee Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 2010), available
at https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/tacir/attachments/Statewide Water Resources.pdf), our other
neighbors have adopted comprehensive regulatory statutes. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.013 (West 2006);
GA. CODE ANN. 12-5-90 (2014); MIss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-1 (2016).
20. Dan Chapman, Tipping Point in Water War?, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
http://specials.myajc.com/georgia-water-war/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2017) (writing that, in the current
Supreme Court litigation, "Georgia's lawyers ... have requested hydrologic flow levels of the
Apalachicola River dating to 1975 in hopes of showing Florida's poor stewardship of the river. Florida,
meanwhile, seeks the number of well permits issued to southwest Georgia farmers to prove lax
regulation by Georgia.").
21. Report of the Special Master, Florida v. Georgia, 2017 WL 656655 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2017) (No.
142, Orig.). In original jurisdiction cases, the Supreme Court usually delegates the process of receiving
.evidence, holding hearings, and drafting an initial report to special masters. See generally, e.g., Anne-
Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court's
Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625 (2002).The Court would then typically accept the
Special Master's report, id. at 656-57, though it may also issue a different opinion based on the record
assembled by the Master, see Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 317 (1984) ("[T]he ultimate
responsibility for deciding what are correct findings of fact remains with us.") or remand to the Master
for further proceedings, see Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995).
22. E.g., Paul Hollis, Alabama Moving Closer to Comprehensive Water Policy, SOUTHEAST
FARM PRESS (July 23, 2013), http://www.southeastfarmpress.com/equipment/alabama-moving-closer-
comprehensive-water-policy (paraphrasing the General Counsel of the Geological Survey of Alabama,
who said at a symposium that Alabama may be vulnerable to federal control over water use through
EPA if the state does not regulate water use). The General Counsel's presentation in turn relied on
statements made by the Director of the Alabama Department of Environmental Management. See
Bennett L. Bearden, Chair, Ala. Water Agencies Working Grp., Alabama Water Policy Update: The
Alabama Water Agencies Working Group (Feb. 13, 2013), www.bipac.net/maalabama/Bearden.ppt.
23. E.g., Ben Raines, ADEM Running Out of Funding May Have to Turn Over Water
Enforcement to EPA, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 28, 2012, 2012 WLNR 14019960; Thomas Spencer,
ADEM's Clean Water Act Enforcement Faces Crackdown, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 3, 2010, 2010
WLNR 20299309.
24. William L. Andreen, Alabama Water Law, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS AL-14 to -18
(Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2017).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2012).
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detail below,26 our failure to regulate our own water resources-while a
problem for many other reasons-is not a reason to worry that the EPA
might interfere with Alabama's management of its own water resources.
Alabama's common law of water resources cannot deal with today's
problems, and Alabama's failure to manage its water resources causes both
direct and collateral harms. Detailed assessments of our water resources are
unnecessary precursors to adopting legislation that fixes these problems.
Why, then, have we not yet acted? Paradoxically, part of the answer may
be the abundance of Alabama's water resources: we have so much water
27
that few have been motivated to challenge current unlawful uses of water.
Without such challenges, the need to fix the common law does not appear
pressing. But the best time to develop a comprehensive solution to the
failings of Alabama's water law is when there is no emergency.
Optimally, and as discussed below,2 8 the state legislature would adopt
the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code.2 9 At a minimum, the legislature
must adopt a statute that (1) eliminates the on-tract restrictions of the
riparian and reasonable use doctrines, (2) permits interbasin transfers of
water, (3) protects the instream flows needed by our ecosystems, and (4)
empowers an agency to coordinate these uses. Any statute that provides for
off-tract use and/or interbasin transfers must at the same time provide for
30
environmental protections.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a detailed description
of Alabama's surface and groundwater common law. Part II assesses the
problems that result from our continued reliance on the common law. Part
III describes the various (and so far ineffective) efforts made in the state
since the late 1980s to develop and adopt meaningful changes to Alabama's
water-resources policy. Part IV concludes by arguing that continued study
is unneeded and that we should adopt the Model Code without delay.
26. See infra notes 174-183 and accompanying text.
27. Approximately ten percent of the fresh surface water in the continental United States flows
through the State of Alabama. James E. Hairston et al., Water Resources in Alabama, ENCYCLOPEDIA
ALA., http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1
6 4 5 (last visited Dec. 22, 2016).
28. See infra Part IV.B.
29. REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE (Am. Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs ed., 1997).
30. E.g., Lee P. Breckenridge, Maintaining Instream Flow and Protecting Aquatic Habitat:
Promise and Perils on the Path to Regulated Riparianism, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 595, 597 (2004) ("A
statutory formulation ... that gives strong attention to quantifying and securing offstream uses without
providing comparable quantification and protection of instream needs can put the ecological integrity of
watersheds at risk . . . ."). For this reason, we should reject bills that approach the problem piecemeal,
such as the one recently introduced in the Alabama Legislature to authorize certain off-tract uses




Sell, Public Hearing Set for Irrigation Bill, TIMES DAILY (Mar. 5, 2017) (noting that Senate Bill 255
does limit withdrawals based on the total average flow of the river at its mouth, but further noting that
this limitation fails to take into account seasonal flow variation and seasonal irrigation needs).
7632017]
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I. THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING USE OF SURFACE AND GROUNDWATER
Alabama is a common law state.31 The common law may be altered by
constitutional provision or statute, but without such alteration, Alabama's
law is that existing in the United Kingdom at the time of the American
Revolution, as altered by subsequent Alabama judicial precedent.32 The
Alabama Supreme Court has made clear that "[t]he common law is not
static, but is constantly undergoing change, and extension, to meet
changing conditions, due to the ever expanding business and social
fabric."33
Thus, in the absence of a constitutional provision or statute providing
otherwise, Alabama follows the common law to determine legal rights to
the waters of the state. And, as the Alabama Supreme Court stated in 1995,
there is no constitutional provision or statute providing otherwise:
"Alabama does not have an agency devoted to the conservation and
management of its water resources. In the absence of statutory authority,
[water-resources] disputes ... must be decided by the courts, applying
common law and equitable principles."34
Alabama does define the "waters of the state" by statute:
A quantity of any spring, brook, creek, stream, river, pond, swamp,
lake, reservoir, impoundment, sound, tidal estuary, bay, waterway,
aquifer, or any other body or accumulation of water, surface water,
or ground water, public or private, natural or artificial, that
a. is contained within the borders of this state;
b. flows through or to this state or any portion thereof; or
c. borders upon this state or any portion thereof, including those
portions of the Gulf of Mexico over which this state has
jurisdiction.
While this definition suggests that all Alabama waters are regulated
together, in fact the relevant legal regime differs depending on the nature of
the water resource. First, water resources law focuses on freshwater, not
31. ALA. CODE § 1-3-1 (1999) ("The common law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent
with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall, together with such institutions and laws,
be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force, except as from time to time it may be altered or
repealed by the Legislature.").
32. E.g., Nelson v. McCrary, 60 Ala. 301, 309 (1877) ("The principle is well settled, that English
statutes, passed before the emigration of our ancestors, so far as consistent with our institutions and
government, unless repealed, constitute a part of the common law prevailing in the States of a common
origin."); Barlow v. Lambert, 28 Ala. 704, 707 (1856) ("[T]he common law . .. is part and parcel of the
law of this State.").
33. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Guyton, 194 So. 655, 658 (Ala. 1940).
34. Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So. 2d 732, 739 (Ala. 1995).
35. ALA. CODE § 9-1OB-3(19) (2001).
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saltwater.3 6 Second, freshwater is regulated under multiple regimes: water
in natural streams and rivers (surface water37 ), as well as flowing
underground water,38 is regulated separately from groundwater.
3 9 Despite
repeated suggestions to regulate surface water and groundwater resources
together,40 Alabama law still treats them separately. Accordingly, in this
Part, I discuss surface-water law separately from groundwater law.
A. Surface Water
To understand rights in surface water in Alabama, it is necessary to
outline how one acquires a right to water, what the nature of that right is,
and whether any statutory enactments alter the right. This Subpart
considers these issues in turn.
. 1. Acquiring a Right to Surface Water
Under the common law, the right to use water from a surface-water
body is typically acquired by owning property riparian to that water body.
4 '
36. Michael Pappas, Unnatural Resource Law: Situating Desalination in Coastal Resource and
Water Law Doctrines, 86 TuL. L. REv. 81, 108 (2011) (discussing how saltwater has "traditionally
fallen outside of' water resource doctrines).
37. I use the term "surface water" to refer to water flowing in natural streams and rivers, as is
typical in discussions of water resources under the common law. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF
WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 2.4 (2013). Under Alabama case law, however, "surface water" is
technically diffuse water flowing across the surface of land due to precipitation or runoff, and such
water is distinguished from water that has reached a defined natural channel. See Barber Pure Milk Co.
v. Young, 81 So. 2d 324, 327 (Ala. 1954). The Alabama Water Resources Act ("Act"), moreover,
defines "surface water" as "[w]ater upon the surface of the earth, whether contained in bounds created
naturally or artificially or diffused." ALA. CODE § 9-10B-3(17).
38. Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900, 901 (Ala. 1980) ("In the eastern
United States, the rules as to usage of underground waters have varied according to whether the waters
were classified as 'percolating water' or as an underground stream. The general rule is that 'where a
subterranean stream flows in a distinct, permanent, well-known and defined channel, it is governed by
the same rules as apply to a natural watercourse on the surface."' (citation omitted)).
39. As just noted, the common law typically treats flowing groundwater (i.e., underground
streams) separately from percolating groundwater (i.e., water filling the spaces between particles of
soil). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 41, topic 4, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1979) ("Most
ground water usable by man is found in the interstices of sand, gravel, porous sandstone or fractured
and partially dissolved limestone."). The Act, however, defines groundwater as "[w]ater in a saturated
zone or stratum beneath the surface of land or water, whether or not flowing through known and definite
channels." ALA. CODE § 9-1OB-3(12) (emphasis added).
40. See WATER FOR A QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 1, at 10 (suggesting that the legislature make
clear that "ground waters and surface waters of the state of Alabama are integrally connected and are
not to be considered as separate in any action by the State or by any city, county, or local agency").
41. Mobile Docks Co. v. City of Mobile, 40 So. 205, 207 (Ala. 1906) ("Riparian rights are not
common to the citizens at large, but exist as incidents to the right of the soil itself adjacent to the water.
In such ownership they have their origin." (emphasis omitted) (quoting McCarthy v. Murphy, 96 N.W.
531 (Wis. 1903))); Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water Co., 6 So. 78, 79 (Ala. 1889) ("[E]very riparian owner of
lands, through which streams of water flow, has a right to the reasonable use of the running water,
which is a private right of property. The right is one annexed and incident to the freehold, being a real
Alabama Law Review
A parcel is riparian if a body of water forms a boundary of the property, if a
stream flows over the property, or if a lake or other static water body is
present within the property.4 2 The riparian "has no property in the water
itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes along."4 3
Under the common law, then, the way to acquire rights to divert water
from a body of water is to purchase property riparian to that body of
water.44 One may purchase an entire existing riparian tract, or a riparian
owner may sell off a portion of her property. So long as the new tract is
itself riparian to the body of water, it is a riparian tract and its owner has
riparian rights.4 5 The number of riparian users on a body of water may
therefore increase-sometimes dramatically, if a large property is
subdivided into many tracts that all have riparian boundaries. If the new
tract is not riparian, however, it loses its riparian character, and its owner
has no right to use water from the nearby body of water.4 6 In this case, the
number of acres considered riparian shrinks (though, in most eastern states,
if those acres are reunified with the riparian acres to reconstitute the
original riparian tract, the entire parcel again becomes riparian47). In a pure
common law state, such as Alabama, the key action is the land purchase: no
permit or license is required to divert.4 8
One question that arises is whether parcels can be combined so as to
increase the number of acres considered riparian. At least one water-law
text states that this possibility has been definitively rejected in the case
law, 49 though some early courts permitted acreage to be added to an already
riparian parcel so that riparian acreage was expanded.50 The Restatement
or corporeal hereditament, in the nature of an easement. . ."); see also De Bardeleben Coal Co. v.
Cox, 76 So. 409, 411 (Ala. Ct. App. 1917) (holding that coal company lacked riparian rights because it
lacked title to streambank).
42. Mobile Docks Co., 40 So. at 207 ("'The rights which a riparian proprietor has, with respect to
the water, are entirely derived from his possession of the land abutting' thereon." (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Upper Potomac Steamboat Co., 109 U.S. 672, 683 (1906))).
43. Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130, 135 (1854) (quoting 3 Kent's Com. 439).
44. 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 722 (3d ed. 1939) ("[T]he
right of the owner of riparian land to the natural flow of water in a stream along the land is a corporeal




47. See BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 32 (5th ed. 2013). However, in some states, particularly in the West, once acres lose their
riparian character, they cannot regain it, even if the parcel is reunified under a common owner. Id.
48. See Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So. 2d 732, 739 (Ala. 1995) ("Alabama does not have an
agency devoted to the conservation and management of its water resources.").
49. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 47, at 32 n. 11 (while "some courts and treatise writers" have
historically supported "the increase in size of a riparian tract by the acquisition of additional land
contiguous to it, even though the added land had [always] been non-riparian," this approach has since
been uniformly rejected).
50. Clark v. Allaman, 80 P. 571 (Kan. 1905); Jones v. Conn, 64 P. 855 (Or. 1901).
766 [Vol. 68:3:759
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(Second) of Torts takes issue with the common law approach, noting that
there is no reason in the humid eastern United States to prevent the
expansion of a riparian tract.5 1 Alabama courts have apparently never
addressed this question. Because the dominant common law rule is that
riparian parcels may not be expanded by the purchase of contiguous
additional acres,5 2 it is extremely likely that an Alabama court would reject
such an effort to expand riparian property.53
As discussed below, water diverted from the neighboring body of water
may only be used on the riparian tract.54 Riparian common law does not
permit the sale of the water rights separate from the property itself.
55
However, under the Alabama cases, if a riparian purports to convey water
rights to a non-riparian, another riparian challenging that conveyance may
enjoin the export of the water only if he can show "special damage."56
Thus, a non-riparian may be able to obtain the water by paying only
nominal damages to the complainant;57 the non-riparian runs the risk,
however, that the complainant can show the special damage and thus
enjoin the use.
The only other way a non-riparian may obtain the right to divert
surface water from any surface-water body is through "prescription."
Prescription is "[t]he acquisition of title to a thing (esp. an intangible thing
such as the use of real property) by open and continuous possession over a
statutory period."58 If a non-riparian openly diverts surface water for a
sufficiently lengthy period, and no riparian challenges that unlawful
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §843 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (the rule rejecting
expansion of riparian acreage makes sense only in "western states that have a dual system of riparian
rights and prior appropriation and in which the appropriation system [see infra note 87] is more suitable
to full development of arid land"; "[t]hese artificial limitations are not needed or desirable when
riparian law provides the principal basis of development .... [That law is] designed to be utilitarian and
to broaden opportunities for water development. Accordingly, the definition of riparian land in this
Section rejects these limitations."). It is worth noting that the Restatement also rejects the on-tract
limitation followed by traditional common law riparianism. Id at ch. 41, topic 3, intro. note; see infra
note 219 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 45-50 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Wehby v. Turpin, 710 So. 2d 1243, 1246-47, 1249 (Ala. 1998) ("This issue is one
of first impression in Alabama. Therefore, we must examine the law of other jurisdictions to gain a
better understanding of the origins and evolution of littoral or riparian rights. Most jurisdictions appear
to adhere to the so-called common law rule.... We are bound to follow the majority common law
rule . . . .").
54. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
55. E.g., Irving's Ex'rs v. Burgess & Town Council of Borough of Media, 10 Pa. Super. 132, 145
(1899) ("[Tlhe riparian right is not an absolute ownership of the water of the stream.... The riparian
owner could not sell the water to a non-riparian owner ..... (quoting Rudolph v. Pa. R.R. Co., 186 Pa.
541 (1898))), affd sub nom. Irving's Ex'rs v. Burgess of Borough of Media, 45 A. 482 (Pa. 1900).
56. Ulbricht v. Eufala Water Co., 6 So. 78, 79 (Ala. 1889).
57. Id.
58. Prescription, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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diversion, the non-riparian acquires the right to continue the diversion.5 9 It
is unclear how long a non-riparian must continue his unlawful diversion for
prescription to create a water right: some cases suggest that the prescriptive
period is currently twenty years;60 some cases, as well as an opinion of the
61former Attorney General of Alabama, put he period at ten years.
Once a non-riparian has diverted a quantity of water for the relevant
period of time, the use of that quantity of water cannot be challenged by a
riparian, even if the use could successfully have been enjoined before the
expiration of the prescriptive period.62 However, prescription protects only
those uses that have continued for the entire prescriptive period.63 Thus, if
the non-riparian has expanded his diversion during the prescriptive period,
that expansion can be enjoined.6
2. Nature of the Surface- Water Right
What water rights come with the ownership of riparian land? Early
cases followed the traditional English "natural flow" doctrine, under which
no riparian owner could diminish the quality or quantity of water flowing
in a stream, and any riparian owner could sue those who interfered with the
natural flow: "It is a legal right of every riparian proprietor, to have the
stream flow through his land in its natural channel, without obstruction, or
59. E.g., Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water Co., 6 So. 78, 79 (Ala. 1889) ("[T]he undisturbed enjoyment
or continuation of [unlawful] acts, without the consent of the owner, [can] ripen into evidence of a right
to do them.").
60. E.g., City of Mountain Brook v. Beatty, 295 So. 2d 388, 392 (Ala. 1974) ("In Alabama the
prescriptive period is 20 years."); Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130, 148 (1854) (analogizing prescriptive
rights in water to adverse possession of land, which has a statute of limitations of twenty years). It is
worth noting that the Beatty case involved a prescriptive right to drainage, not a prescriptive right to a
diversion of water. See Beatty, 295 So. 2d at 402.
61. Water Rights-Prescriptive Period, Ala. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2012-79 (2012), 2012 WL
3689602 (opinion letter issued by Luther Strange); e.g., Cobia v. Ellis, 42 So. 751, 752-53 (Ala. 1906)
(stating that ten years was the relevant statute of limitations for a suit to enjoin "wrongful diversion of
water").
62. Ulbricht, 6 So. at 78-79. Because prescription cuts off the ability of a riparian to challenge
an unlawful use of water, courts do not require a riparian to show that she is harmed by a non-riparian's
diversion in order to bring a lawsuit challenging that diversion as unlawful. Id at 79. Instead, the court
resolves the challenge but (if the riparian wins) may stay any injunction of the non-riparian diversion
until such time as the riparian can show that the diversion has become harmful. Id.
63. See id. at 79-80.
64. Wright & Rice v. Moore, 38 Ala. 593, 598 (1863) ("If the dams which existed ten years
before the disturbance alleged in the complainants' bill, produced a refluence upon the defendants'
land, then there might be a prescriptive right to that extent; but an increase of the refluence, by an
additional elevation, within ten years, would be an unauthorized invasion of another's right."); see also,
e.g., Stephens Ranch & Livestock Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 161 P. 459, 461 (Utah 1916) ("[A]fter a
prescriptive right or easement has been acquired by a dominant owner the means of diversion used by
him may not be changed or enlarged so as to materially increased the flow of water to the detriment of
the servient owner.").
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interruption, or even an alteration of its level."6 5 However, due to the
natural flow doctrine's anti-developmental implications,6  both
legislatureS67 and courtS68 had permitted some departures from the strict
doctrine.
In Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water Co.,69 decided in 1889, the Alabama
Supreme Court departed from the natural flow doctrine, suggesting that it
would adopt a new rule that had evolved in other common law states.
Under that new approach, a riparian owner has the right to use the waters of
the stream, even if that use results in perceptible diminution of the quantity
and/or quality of water in the stream, so long as that use is "reasonable."
7 0
The Alabama Supreme Court has suggested that natural flow doctrine had
become qualified by "the limitation . .. that each of such proprietors is
entitled to a reasonable use of the water for domestic, agricultural, and
manufacturing purposes."7 '
At the same time, however, the Court stated that the diversion at issue
was "rendered unlawful by the fact that it is for an extraordinary or
artificial use, and is not restored to its natural channel, where it is
accustomed to flow." 72 It is unclear whether the Court was disturbed by the
use itself (which would be prohibited by natural flow doctrine) or by the
65. Wright, 38 Ala. at 596; Stein v. Burden, 29 Ala. 127, 129 (1856) ("[H]e may use the water
while it runs over his lands, but he cannot unreasonably detain it, or give it another direction; and he
must return it to its ordinary channel when it leaves his estate." (emphasis omitted) (quoting 3 Kent's
Com. 439)); Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130, 139-40 (1854) ("It is well settled, that each proprietor,
bounded by a water course not navigable, has a right to the use of the water in its natural flow; each
may retain it, as it passes through his lands, but cannot divert it. . . . The proprietor is entitled to the
whole momentum of the fall; any diversion of the water, however small, abstracts a portion of his
rights; and for this he may maintain an action, without proving any special or appreciable damage.");
Hendricks v. Johnson, 6 Port. 472, 496 (Ala. 1837) ("By the rules of the common law, all proprietors of
lands have precisely the same rights to waters flowing through their domains, and one can never be
permitted so to use the stream, as to injure or annoy those who are situated on the course of it either
above or below him.").
66. Cf Drake v. Lady Ensley Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 14 So. 749, 751 (Ala. 1894) ("[A]s a rule,
every one must so enjoy his own property as not to offend his neighbor's equal right to enjoy his own
unmolested. But this rule cannot be enforced, in its strict letter, without impeding rightful progress, and
without hindering industrial enterprise.").
67. Hendricks, 6 Port. at 497-98 (under the common law, "the instances were rare, in which
mills could be erected without subjecting their owners to [legal] consequences which might prove
ruinous," and thus the Mississippi Territory (Alabama's predecessor) in 1811 adopted "an act to
encourage the building of public mills, and directing the duties of millers").
68. Lewis v. Stein, 16 Ala. 214, 219 (1849) (recognizing the right of the defendant to construct
and maintain a mill, thus impeding the natural flow of the stream, but noting that "the rights of those
below him forbade him so to construct it as to render the water impure, or to corrupt or injure its
quality" (emphasis omitted)).
69. 6 So. 78 (Ala. 1889).
70. Id. at 79.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 591.
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defendant's export of the water altogether (something that would be
forbidden under either the natural flow or riparian doctrines
73). 74
By 1893, however, Alabama had clearly abandoned the natural flow
doctrine and replaced it with the riparian doctrine:
It is certainly true that owing to the wants, if not the necessities, of
the present age,--of agriculture, of manufactures, of commerce, of
invention, and of the arts and sciences,-some changes must be
tolerated in the channels in which water naturally flows, and in its
adaptation to beneficial uses. Reasonable diminution of its
quantity, in gratifying and meeting customary wants, has always
been permitted. So, its temporary detention for manufacturing
purposes, followed by its release in increased volume, is a
necessary consequence of its utilization as a propelling force. Nor
must we shut our eyes to the tendency-the inevitable tendency-
of these and other uses, in which water is an indispensable element,
to detract somewhat from its normal purity.75
Alabama riparian doctrine follows this approach to the present day.76
Under the common law riparianism, any riparian owner has the right to
make reasonable use of the waters of the stream.77 A riparian is generally
not liable to another for subsistence uses: "[A] riparian proprietor has the
right to consume even the whole of the water of a stream, if absolutely
necessary for the wants of himself and family."78
However, so-called "artificial" uses-those that are not "natural"
subsistence uses-must be adjusted among riparians.7 9 In other words, the
73. See supra note 65, infra notes 98-101, and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Andreen, supra note 24, at AL-I (describing Ulbricht as "beg[inning] the journey
towards the reasonable use doctrine").
75. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hamilton, 14 So. 167, 170 (Ala. 1893).
76. E.g., Cove Properties, Inc. v. Walter Trent Marina, Inc., 702 So. 2d 472, 475 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997); Crommelin v. Fain, 403 So. 2d 177, 184 (Ala. 1981); Beaunit Corp. v. Ala. Power Co., 370 F.
Supp. 1044, 1051 & n.9 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Elmore v. Ingalls, 17 So. 2d 674, 674-76 (Ala. 1944); Jones
v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 80 So. 463, 464 (Ala. 1918). But see Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Champion,
49 So. 416, 416 (Ala. 1909) (stating, in a case involving alteration of stream flow by a railroad bridge,
"[tihe law is well settled in this state, as well as elsewhere, that a landowner through whose lands a
stream of water flows has a right to have the water to course or flow from his land according to
nature").
77. Ulbricht, 6 So. at 79.
78. Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130, 146 (1854) (citation omitted); see also Crommelin, 403 So. 2d
at 184.
79. Jones, 80 So. at 464 ("Such proprietor has the right to the extraordinary or artificial use of
the stream and its waters, provided that by the use of such water it is not forced back or unreasonably or
improperly precipitated on the lands of adjacent proprietors, and after its use it is restored to its natural
channel without unreasonable or material diminution before it leaves the land of persons diverting or
subjecting it to artificial uses, and provided, further, it is not so polluted as to unreasonably, injuriously,
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right of a riparian owner to make artificial use of the waters of the stream is
limited by the correlative rights of other riparians to make similar use of the
stream.s0 Thus, a riparian owner may not so diminish the flow of a stream,
or so pollute it, that it harms the ability of other riparians to make their own
reasonable uses of the water.81
Competing artificial uses are evaluated using only a test of
reasonableness.82 While the Restatement (Second) of Torts gives a number
of factors that go into a reasonableness inquiry,8 3 most riparian jurisdictions
give little guidance for conducting the inquiry. The following quotation
from an Arkansas case is illustrative:
When one lawful use of water interferes with or detracts from
another lawful use, then a question arises as to whether, under all
the facts and circumstances of that particular case, the interfering
use shall be declared unreasonable and as such enjoined, or
whether a reasonable and equitable adjustment should be made,
having due regard to the reasonable rights of each.84
A court investigating the relative reasonableness of competing uses
"undertake[s] a polycentric process that, at the very least, strains the
capacity of courts to act in the traditional mode of disinterested umpire."
A riparian gains no special rights to water by being the first to use it,86
in contrast to the prior appropriation doctrine in the western United
States. Instead, a riparian right can exist inchoate: a riparian who has
never used the waters of the stream may initiate a new use of the water; at
that point, other riparians must adjust to that use, so long as it is
or materially affect its ordinary and extraordinary use by the proprietor of the land into which the
unused waters flow by its accustomed channel.").
80. Ulbricht, 6 So. at 79 (the right "must be enjoyed with reference to the similar rights of other
riparian proprietors. It is therefore a qualified, and not an absolute, right of property").
81. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hamilton, 14 So. 167, 169-70 (Ala. 1893) ("Any diversion or
obstruction of the water, which substantially diminishes the volume of the stream .. . or which defiles
and corrupts it to such a degree as essentially to impair its purity, and prevent the use of it for any of the
reasonable and proper purposes to which running water is usually applied, such as irrigation, the
propulsion of machinery, or consumption for domestic use, is an infringement of the right of other
owners of land through which a water course runs. . .
82. Jones, 80 So. at 464.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
84. Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Ark. 1955).
85. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at the
Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 9, 14 (2002).
86. Hendricks v. Johnson, 6 Port. 472, 496 (1837) (rejecting party's claim that he had "acquired
prior right to the use of the stream").
87. See generally TARLOCK, supra note 37, § 5.30 (under the prior appropriation system,
"[w]ater rights are ranked in the order that the right was acquired").
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reasonable." Cases in other states do sometimes implicitly protect existing
uses,8 9 though Alabama cases have allowed significant disturbance of
existing uses by new riparian uses.90 (As discussed below, the possibility
exists that the Alabama Water Resources Act alters this common law rule,
although the Act also disavows any intent to alter common law rights.91)
Riparians therefore have no certainty of right: while a riparian will
always be able to use some quantity of water (unless the body of water runs
dry9 2), no specific quantity of water is ever guaranteed.9 3 An existing use
may become sufficiently unreasonable over time that the riparian is
required to reduce the amount of water diverted.94 For example, while in
the past it might have been reasonable to practice flood irrigation, today
such enormous uses of water might be unreasonable (and pivot or drip
irrigation would be considered reasonable).95 Or another riparian may
initiate use of the water where no use has been made before, leading to an
adjustment of all riparian withdrawals to accommodate the new use.96 Even
if a riparian had previously litigated water uses with neighboring riparians,
the judgment in that litigation can be rendered obsolete by changed
circumstances (whether from changed climate, new riparian uses, or
evolution of technology).9 7
88. Crommelin v. Fain, 403 So. 2d 177, 184 (Ala. 1981) (requiring one riparian's long-standing
use of the water of a stream to be cut back to accommodate a newly initiated use by another riparian on
the same stream); Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water Co., 6 So. 78, 80 (Ala. 1889) ("The mere non-user of a
water-power by a riparian owner will not operate to impair his title, or confer any right thereto on
another."). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A cmt. k (contending that courts applying
the reasonableness test do, in fact, give preference to existing uses over new uses).
89. E.g., Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1950); Hoover v. Crane, 106 N.W.2d
563 (Mich. 1960). The Restatement of Torts adopts this approach. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 850A.
90. Crommelin, 403 So. 2d at 184.
91. See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
92. This may be caused by drought, or, on a small stream, by an upstream user exhausting the
stream for subsistence uses, see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
93. 94 C.J.S. Waters § 814 (2016) ("The quantity of water that a riparian owner is entitled to
depends on such factors and varies with the volume of water in the stream and the needs of other
riparian proprietors." (footnote omitted)).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A cmt. h, illus. 5.
95. Id. cmt. h.
96. Id. Because the riparian right exists even if it goes unused, see supra note 88 and
accompanying text, and because new riparian tracts can be created by the subdivision of existing
riparian tracts, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, it is quite easy for new users to begin to
divert.
97. E.g., Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 P.2d 1002 (Okla. 1946) ("The common law of
riparian rights as to the use of water by riparian owners is not a doctrine of fixed rights.... [J]udgments
and decrees [from riparian jurisdictions] can usually be regarded as res judicata only so long as the
conditions upon which they were rendered remain the same." (quoting In re Water Rights in Silvies
River, 237 P. 322, 357 (Or. 1925))).
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Use of water from surface-water bodies is restricted to riparian land
and to the watershed of the relevant water body.98 Thus, a riparian may not
divert water for use off-tract, nor may a riparian convey the right to use
water to a non-riparian for use on a non-riparian tract.99 If a riparian owns a
piece of property, a portion of which is located outside the watershed of the
river or lake, the riparian may not divert water from the neighboring water
body onto those acres (or, at least, if the riparian does make such a
diversion and a neighbor notices, that diversion can be enjoined by a
court).100 One result of this rule is that municipalities owning riparian
property may not export water from that property for use in public water
systems.101
3. Statutory Overlay
The Alabama Legislature added a statutory component to water-
resources law in 1993 when it enacted the Alabama Water Resources
Act.10 2 The Act makes clear that it is not intended to change existing
common law regarding existing or future riparian rights to water.0
3
Instead, its main purpose is to create a statewide administrative body to
gather quantitative information about water use in Alabama and to provide
mechanisms to deal with certain limited situations of water shortage."0
Under the Act, several categories of users05 must submit "declaration[s] of
beneficial use" detailing their water usage to the Office of Water Resources
98. Water-Riparian Rights, Ala. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2000-226 (2000), 2000 WL 33310729
(opinion letter issued by Bill Pryor); see also Andreen, supra note 24, at AL-2 ("[T]he cases assume
that water can be used only on riparian lands and generally cannot be conveyed off the premises for use
on non-riparian lands."); Mobile Docks Co. v. City of Mobile, 40 So. 205, 207 (Ala. 1906) ("Riparian
rights are ... incidents to the right of the soil itselfadjacent to the water." (emphasis added)).
99. Irving's Ex'rs v. Burgess & the Town Council of Media, 10 Pa. Super. 132, 145 (1898), af'd
sub nom. Irving's Ex'rs v. Burgess of Borough of Media, 45 A. 482 (Pa. 1900).
100. TARLOCK, supra note 37, § 3.51.
101. H. A. W., Annotation, Waters: Right of Municipality, as Riparian Owner, to Use of Water
for Public Supply, 141 A.L.R. 639 (1942) ("[A] municipality, as a riparian owner merely, has no right
to divert or abstract the waters of a stream for the purposes of public water supply."); see Stein v.
Burden, 24 Ala. 130 (1854).
102. Water Resources Act, No. 93-44, 1993 Ala. Laws 78 (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 9-lOB-1 to
-30 (2001)).
103. ALA. CODE § 9-1OB-27 (2001).
104. William S. Cox, III, An Introduction to the Alabama Water Resources Act, 55 ALA. LAW.
176, 177 (1994).
105. The Act requires reporting of water use by public water systems (as defined by the Act);
those who actually divert, withdraw, or consume more than 100,000 gallons of surface or groundwater
water per day; and irrigators with the capacity to divert, withdraw, or consume more than 100,000
gallons of surface or groundwater per day. ALA. CODE § 9-10B-20. The Act also authorizes the
identification of additional user categories by regulations promulgated by the Office of Water
Resources. Id.
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(OWR), an entity created by the Act. 06 OWR does not evaluate the
described use or make choices among uses, as a permitting agency would;
instead, OWR is obliged to issue a "certificate of use" after determining
that a declaration of beneficial use has been "properly submitted."10 7
Confusingly, however, a declaration of beneficial use "shall establish
that the proposed diversion, withdrawal, or consumption of such water
shall not interfere with any presently known existing legal use of such
water."1os Presumably, then, an applicant who has not made the required
showing has not complied with the requirements for submitting a
declaration of beneficial use, and OWR could not issue a certificate of use.
Such a requirement would, however, be in serious tension with riparian
common law, which does not make temporal priority a factor in balancing
riparian uses.109 The Act states that "[n]othing contained in this chapter
shall change or modify existing common or statutory law with respect to
the rights of existing or future riparian owners concerning the use of the
waters of the state."' 0 It is thus difficult to see how OWR can comply with
both mandates.
Conditions on permit holders may be imposed in certain circumstances.
If the OWR completes a "critical use study"1 1 concluding that water
supply is insufficient to meet water needs in a particular area, the Alabama
Water Resources Commission (another entity created by the Act1 2) may
designate that area a "capacity stress area."'1 3 Once that designation has
been made, conditions or limitations may be imposed through a rulemaking
process on those in the capacity stress area with certificates of use.114
106. Id. §§ 9-10B-20, -4.
107. Id. § 9-1OB-20(e) ("The Office of Water Resources shall issue a certificate of use to any
person required to submit a declaration of beneficial use upon the submission of a declaration of
beneficial use." (emphasis added)); Water-Riparian Rights, Ala. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2000-226 (2000),
2000 WL 33310729 (opinion letter issued by Bill Pryor) (OWR "has discretion in determining whether
[a] declaration of beneficial use is, in fact, properly submitted"). Regulations require those who submit
declarations of beneficial use to state the "basis of legal right to use the water to be diverted," see Ala.
Admin. Code § 305-7-10-.02(1)(h), and to demonstrate that the filer is making "a lawful, reasonable
and beneficial use of water," see Ala. Admin. Code § 305-7-10-.02(2)(b). While this arguably gives
OWR a basis upon which to deny certificates of use to those applicants whose diversions are illegal, on
the ground that such applications are not "properly submitted," see Andreen, supra note 24, at AL-I I to
-12, it is unclear whether OWR has ever used this argument to justify denying a certificate of use.
108. Id
109. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
110. ALA. CODE § 9-10B-27.
111. Id. §§9-10B-3(7),-21.
112. Id §9-10B-12.
113. Id. §§ 9-1OB-3(3), -21. A capacity stress area is "[a]n area of the state designated by the
commission pursuant to this chapter where the commission determines that the use of the waters of the
state, whether ground water, surface water, or both, requires coordination, management, and regulation
for the protection of the interests and rights of the people of the state." Id. § 9-10B-3(3).
114. Id. § 9-10B-22.
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Although there have been severe droughts in Alabama since 1993, a
capacity stress designation has never been made.
B. Groundwater
As with surface water, groundwater rights in Alabama are determined
by three questions: how one acquires a right to water, what the nature of
that right is, and whether any statutory enactments alter the right.
1. Acquiring a Right to Groundwater
Alabama's common law of groundwater, like that of surface water,
confers rights based on property ownership.'
15 Those who own land
overlying an aquifer have the right to extract and use that groundwater on
the overlying tract.116 To obtain groundwater rights, then, one must
purchase an existing overlying tract or a new overlying tract created by the
subdivision of an existing tract. One Alabama case suggests in dicta that
groundwater rights could also be acquired by prescription."
7
Unlike the riparian doctrine, however, groundwater doctrine does not
prohibit the off-tract use of water." 8 It is possible to export groundwater for
use on a non-overlying tract if one purchases an overlying parcel from
which to export or, presumably, if one bargains with an overlying owner
for access to her tract for pumping. Export of water for use on a non-
overlying tract will be enjoined, however, if that export harms the water
rights of an overlying landowner. In Martin v. City of Linden, the plaintiff
(an overlying landowner) sued the city for its proposed export of water for
municipal use fifteen miles away on land that did not overlie the aquifer.1
9
The city's plan to drill a permanent well and build a pipeline to export the
groundwater was enjoined because the court found that the city's pumping
would cause a deterioration in the quality of the plaintiffs water.
20
115. Cf Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So. 2d 732, 738 (Ala. 1995).
116. See Adams v. Lang, 553 So. 2d 89 (Ala. 1989).
117. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Higginbotham, 44 So. 872, 874 (Ala. 1907).
118. Martin, 667 So. 2d at 737 ("We agree with the City that this potential harm [regarding the
drawdown effect to the overlying landowner's well as a result of the City's drilling] is not sufficient 
to
warrant the issuance of an injunction, because the [the overlying landowner] has an adequate remedy at
law, and the City has offered to pay for any damage or new equipment and drilling needed by the
plaintiff." (emphasis omitted)).




2. The Nature of the Groundwater Right
Alabama originally inherited from England an approach to
groundwater known as the "rule of capture" or "rule of
absolute ... ownership," under which overlying landowners can pump as
much groundwater as they wish, for whatever purpose they wish, and those
whose own use of the groundwater is harmed thereby have no legal
remedy.12 1 In 1936, the Alabama Supreme Court replaced the rule of
capture with the American reasonable use rule.122 One should not read too
much into the word "reasonable," however:
"[R]easonable" was used in a very special and restricted sense. A
waste of water or a wasteful use of water was unreasonable only if
it caused harm, and any nonwasteful use of water that caused harm
was nevertheless reasonable if it was made on or in connection
with the overlying land.123
Thus, an overlying landowner's extraction of groundwater is essentially
unlimited, so long as the water is used non-wastefully for something
beneficial.12 4 In other words, as between overlying landowners, there is no
liability for harm caused by the non-frivolous use of water. 25 Thus, in
Adams v. Lang, where both the plaintiff and the defendant owned land
overlying the aquifer, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to hold the
defendant liable, even though his groundwater pumping harmed the
plaintiffs artesian well, because the defendant was pumping the
groundwater to farm catfish, a beneficial use.126 As noted above, however,
when groundwater is exported, liability will lie against the exporter if an
overlying landowner can show that the export harms her.12 7
It should be noted that Alabama applies a different rule when
groundwater is pumped, not for beneficial use, but incidental to another
activity on the overlying owner's land. For example, when groundwater is
pumped to dewater a mine, the pumper is not pumping to use the
groundwater but instead to eliminate it so that he can proceed with his
121. Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900, 901-02 (1980).
122. Id. at 901 (citing Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 165 So. 764 (Ala. 1936) and
Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 181 So. 276 (Ala. 1938)).
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 41, topic 4, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
124. See Adams v. Lang, 553 So. 2d 89, 92 (Ala. 1989).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 41, topic 4, intro. note ("As between persons using
the water on the overlying land, the American rule made no apportionment among users and gave no
protection to their wells and springs. If the water was withdrawn for the purpose of making a beneficial
use of or on the land from which it was taken, no liability was incurred for resulting harm to an
adjoining landowner.").
126. Adams, 553 So. 2d. at 92.
127. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
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mining activities. When such pumping interferes with another landowner's
beneficial use of the groundwater, the rule of decision is that of nuisance
law, not of reasonable use.12 8
3. Statutory Overlay
The Alabama Water Resources Act, discussed above, governs
groundwater use as well as surface-water use.1
2 9 The Act requires water-use
reporting by certain statutorily defined users of groundwater.
130 And the
Act permits conditions to be imposed on permit holders when the OWR
completes a "critical use study"'13' and the Alabama Water Resources
Commission designates a "capacity stress area."
132 While the Act
specifically preserves the common law governing surface water, that
provision refers only to "riparian land owners."'
1 33 Thus, it is possible that
the Act does not protect rights in groundwater in the same way that it
protects rights in surface water.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING LAW
As the discussion above makes clear, the common law is flawed, and
the Alabama Water Resources Act does not do anything to cure those
flaws. These flaws are harmful, as this Part will demonstrate.
A. Flaws in Common Law Doctrine
Alabama follows common law riparian doctrine for surface water
1 34
and the common law American reasonable use rule for groundwater;
13 5 the
Water Resources Act imposes some additional limits only when a capacity
128. Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1980).
129. ALA. CODE § 9-1OB-3(19) (2001) (defining "waters of the state" to include "[a] quantity of
any . .. aquifer, or any other body or accumulation of water, surface water, or ground water, public or
private, natural or artificial").
130. The Act requires reporting of water use by public water systems (as defined by the Act):
those who actually divert, withdraw, or consume more than 100,000 gallons of surface water or
groundwater per day; and irrigators with the capacity to divert, withdraw, or consume more than
100,000 gallons of surface or groundwater per day. Id § 9-10B-20.
131. Id. §§ 9-10B-3(7), -21.
132. Id. § § 9-10B-3(3), -21. A capacity stress area is "[a]n area of the state designated by the
commission pursuant to this chapter where the commission determines that the use of the waters of the
state, whether ground water, surface water, or both, requires coordination, management, and regulation
for the protection of the interests and rights of the people of the state." Id. § 9-10B-3(3).
133. Id § 9-1OB-27 ("Nothing contained in this chapter shall change or modify existing common
or statutory law with respect to the rights of existing or future riparian owners concerning the use of the
waters of the state.").
134. See supra notes 41-101 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 115-128 and accompanying text.
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stress designation has been made.13 6 Under the common law, water from a
surface-water body may be used only on a tract of land contiguous with
that water body,137 and, while water may be exported to tracts that do not
overlie an aquifer, that export will be enjoined if an overlying landowner
can show she is harmed thereby.13 8 The only exception to these rules is
139prescription.
There are at least four significant problems with Alabama's common
law of water resources. First, water rights are uncertain: even if one is a
riparian or overlying landowner, the quantity of water one may divert is not
guaranteed, rendering investments uncertain and planning for the future
difficult. Second, litigation is required to adjust uses, which makes
adjustments expensive, time-consuming, and unpredictable. Third, while
riparian common law gives preference to individual subsistence rights, the
common law does not create any other hierarchy of uses, something most
critics correctly find untenable. Finally, the on-tract restrictions of both
riparian and American reasonable use doctrine are unduly restrictive
(though arguably environmentally beneficial). I will discuss each issue in
turn.
1. Uncertainty ofRight
The riparian right, as the discussion in Part L.A makes clear, comes
with no guarantee of a particular quantity of water.140 Because the riparian
right is correlative, a riparian's current use may become unreasonable as
circumstances change. Moreover, because a riparian retains the right to use
water from the neighboring water body, even if she has never used water
before, a new use may be instituted at any point, and other users must
adjust. Finally, because the test for riparian uses is the extremely flexible
"reasonableness" test, it can be difficult to determine whether a use
considered reasonable at one time and place is a good predictor of
reasonableness of other, similar uses.
Uncertainty for groundwater use comes from two sources. First, as
between overlying landowners, there is no rule that tells us how to resolve
conflicts between competing uses.141 Thus, one overlying owner could
initiate pumping that causes his neighbor's wells to dry up; the common
136. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 98-1Oland accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 58-63, 117 and accompanying text. As noted above, prescriptive rights in
surface water are well known; prescriptive rights in groundwater are conceptually available but have
not, apparently, been litigated.
140. See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
778 [Vol. 68:3:759
The Failings of Alabama Water Law
law imposes no liability and thus no protection for the neighbor's
investments in his wells. Second, an exporter of groundwater is always in a
tenuous situation: should his pumping begin to cause harm to any overlying
landowner-whether that harm is caused by drawing down the aquifer or
by diminishing the aquifer's quality142-an injunction of that pumping will
lie. 143
Under both the riparian and American reasonable use doctrines, then,
water rights are uncertain. Uncertainty has significant individual and social
costs.1" As Professor Thompson has explained, uncertainty "makes it
difficult to plan and manage activities," "raises the chance that people will
make the wrong decision[s]," "impose[s] psychological costs," and causes
"people [to] take [steps] to avoid or reduce the risks of uncertainty [that]
are also costly to themselves and to society."
1 4 5 While the costs of
uncertainty may not always exceed the costs of rendering property rights
definite,14 6 the uncertainty of both riparianism and the reasonable use rule
for groundwater seem sufficiently problematic to justify a new approach.1
47
2. Need to Litigate
Under both the riparian doctrine and the American reasonable use rule,
conflicts among uses are resolved by litigation. While a putative user of
water could bring a declaratory judgment action to determine water rights
before making investments in infrastructure and the like, such lawsuits are
rare and difficult to pursue.14 8  Instead, most users proceed with
142. The harm in the Martin case, for example, was that Mrs. Martin's water quality would have
been affected by the City's proposed pumping. See Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So.2d 732, 737 (Ala.
1995). The Martin Court noted that it would not be enough to justify enjoining the City's export if Mrs.
Martin's complaint had been solely that she was being forced to drill a deeper well; so long as both the
exporter and the overlying landowner would then have adequate water supplies, the costs incurred to
drill a deeper well could be redressed by a damages judgment. Id.
143. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
144. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Uncertainty and Markets in Water Resources, 36 McGEORGE L.
REV. 117, 120-22 (2005).
145. Id.
146. E.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285 (2008).
147. See generally Robert H. Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist
Theory of Change, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381 (1989).
148. Depending on the body of water at issue, the class of defendants to a declaratory judgment
action may number in the thousands. The City of Virginia Beach, for example, brought a class action
declaratory judgment against "all owners of riparian lands on the Roanoke River below the Roanoke
Rapids Dam." See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 47, at 117 (providing an edited version of the
complaint in City of Va. Beach v. Champion Int'l Corp., Civ. 84-10-N (D. Va. 1984)). The Roanoke
River flows 220 kilometers from the dam to the Albemarle Sound, see ANA MARIA GARCIA, U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR, EFFECTS OF FLOOD CONTROL AND OTHER RESERVOIR OPERATIONS ON THE WATER
QUALITY OF THE LOWER ROANOKE RIVER, NORTH CAROLINA 3 (2012),
https://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2012/5101/pdf/2012-5101.pdf, and comprises many hundreds of parcels, see
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construction and operation under the shadow of litigation that might be
brought in the future by other riparian owners. Such litigation may result in
an injunction of some portion of the riparian's use, rendering a concomitant
portion of the riparian's investments fruitless.
And even apart from the outcome produced, litigation is expensive and
time-consuming.149 The inherently flexible nature of the "reasonableness"
test means that water-rights judgments may well be one-time-use only: a
subsequent lawsuit involving some of the same parties may nevertheless
produce very different results.150 Litigation (unless the plaintiff has pursued
a declaratory judgment) is necessarily retrospective, curing damages
already caused and/or enjoining activities that have already been invested
mn.
3. No Hierarchy of Uses
Apart from the riparian doctrine's preference for natural (i.e.,
subsistence) uses,15 1 the riparian doctrine gives no preference for any use
over any other use. There is no automatic preference, for example, for
municipal water supply over recreational uses. Indeed, riparian common
law makes no provision at all for municipal uses, preventing cities and
towns from diverting water for municipal supply. 15 2 Nor does the American
reasonable use rule give a preference for any particular uses: as between
overlying landowners, the rule of the biggest and deepest pump applies,
and as between overlying and non-overlying owners, the overlying owner
wins if she shows harm.15 3
Yet most policy makers would probably agree that some uses of water
are more important than other uses of water. Providing reliable water
supply to the citizens of a state and providing reliable flow for power
generation, for example, are arguably more important uses than water for
industrial or commercial purposes. And, indeed, most states that have
Statewide Parcels for North Carolina, N.C. ONE MAP,
http://www.nconemap.com/ParcelsforNorthCarolina.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). The scope of the
defendant class in such an action gives a sense of the difficulty in litigating these issues.
149. E.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility ofLitigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171, 174 (2014)
("By rendering litigation unduly expensive, time-consuming, and burdensome, the pretrial process may
lead parties to forego their rights or settle cases based on expense and delay, rather than on the
merits.").
150. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
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altered the riparian common law by statute have included, at a minimum, a
mandate for preferring municipal water supply over competing uses.1
54
4. On-Tract Restriction
Riparian common law limits the use of diverted surface water to the
riparian tract.155 The American reasonable use doctrine prohibits export of
groundwater when export harms overlying landowners.156 Yet there is no
reason to expect that riparian or overlying land is the best location for
productive use of water. Indeed, given the vagaries of topography and the
metes and bounds of lots, riparian land might well be hilly and rocky, while
non-riparian land might be the most arable. And if one of the best uses of
water is to provide municipal supply, the on-tract restriction directly
prevents that use, because diversion of water into a municipal system
necessarily moves water off-tract.157 Thus the on-tract and anti-export
limitations of the common law operate to prevent eminently sensible uses
of surface and groundwater.
One benefit of the on-tract and in-watershed restrictions, however, is
that they necessarily keep water in the relevant stream or lake. While the
water is kept in a stream or lake for the benefit of downstream or
neighboring riparians, the water provides serious incidental benefits to
many entities. Animals, plants, and ecosystems benefit from the continued
flow of water. Thus, any effort to relax on-tract restrictions must come with
equal effort to protect instream flows.
B. Inadequacy ofExisting Regulatory Mechanisms
The Alabama Water Resources Act, as noted above, is not a regulatory
statute that creates a permitting system regulating water use.158 Instead, it
creates largely an information-gathering agency, one that has little ability to
enforce even these information-providing requirements.159 The Act itself
gives OWR almost no enforcement power: for example, the statute does
not empower OWR to enter private property to confirm reported water uses
or to investigate water users who fail to report under the Act.
154. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-217(d) (2016); MD. CODE ANN. ENVIR. § 5-502(d)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 103G.261 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-242
(2014).
155. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 102-114, 129-133 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
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The Act does give OWR the authority to make capacity stress
designations.16 0 But the Act itself says almost nothing about how to
determine what conditions must exist to justify the designation of a
capacity stress area, nor does it outline a procedure for making a capacity
stress designation or for returning an area to its pre-stress status. And,
despite these statutory lacunae, OWR has not adopted gap-filling rules.
What's more, capacity stress designation is always a reaction to an existing
problem, applying only when water resources are so low that a basin is
already under stress.161 If OWR may make capacity stress designations only
when water problems have emerged, it has no ability to prevent those
problems from emerging in the first place, no matter how inevitable they
are absent intervention.
Finally, even if OWR exercised its meager powers to the fullest, the
Act specifically states that it does not affect existing riparian rights.16 2
Thus, the common law really is the governing law for Alabama's water
resources. And, as noted above, the common law is seriously flawed.163
C. Collateral Consequences ofFailures to Act
In addition to the direct failings of Alabama's common law water-
resources policy, our failure to adopt comprehensive regulation has at least
one serious collateral consequence: failing to regulate puts us at a marked
disadvantage in interstate water-resources litigation. In this Section, I also
show that worries about EPA intervention in Alabama water policy are
unfounded.
1. Interstate Water-Resources Litigation
The United States Supreme Court is the court of first instance in suits
between states: the United States Constitution gives the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction over suits between or among. states,16 4 and this is the
one head of the Court's original jurisdiction that Congress has not made
concurrent with the lower courts.'65 It has been said that suits between
states replace warl66 as a mode of problem solving. Accordingly, the
160. ALA. CODE § 9-1OB-20 (2001).
161. See id § § 9-1OB-3(3), -21.
162. Id. § 9-10B-27.
163. See supra notes 134-157 and accompanying text.
164. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2012).
166. E.g., Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992) ("The model case for invocation of
this Court's original jurisdiction is a dispute between States of such seriousness that it would amount to
casus belli if the States were fully sovereign." (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 571 n.18
(1983))).
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Supreme Court exercises its original jurisdiction over state-versus-state
disputes "sparingly."l67
A prudential standard has thus been developed to make sure that a
state-versus-state dispute rises to the level of importance to justify the
Court's intervention. As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in Mississippi v.
Louisiana:
Chief Justice Fuller wrote nearly a century ago that our original
"jurisdiction is of so delicate and grave a character that it was not
contemplated that it would be exercised save when the necessity
was absolute." Recognizing the "delicate and grave" character of
our original jurisdiction, we have interpreted the Constitution and
28 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) as making our original jurisdiction "obligatory
only in appropriate cases," and as providing us "with substantial
discretion to make case-by-case judgments as to the practical
necessity of an original forum in this Court."1 6 8
To implement these limitations, the Court imposes a heightened
standard of injury on states who invoke its original jurisdiction. "Before
this court can be moved to exercise its extraordinary power under the
Constitution to control the conduct of one state at the suit of another, the
threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be
established by clear and convincing evidence."'69
This heightened standard has been applied in "equitable
apportionment" cases-those cases that allocate shared waters among
states-to include a requirement that states.have helped themselves before
they ask the Court for help: "No State can use its lax administration to
establish its claim to water." 7 0 The Court has also said that its exercise of
jurisdiction rests in part on "the seriousness and dignity of the claim."
These rules would apply to litigation in the Supreme Court over, for
example, the Apalachicola-Flint-Chattahoochee and Alabama-Coosa-
Tallapoosa basins. The worry is that Alabama's failure to take steps to
better manage its resources will lead the Court to find that Alabama must
not have suffered the kind of substantial injury that justifies equitable
apportionment, that Alabama's "lax administration" will vitiate its claim to
167. United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 538 (1973).
168. 506 U.S. at 76 (first quoting Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900); then quoting Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972); and then quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554,
570 (1983)).
169. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921) (citation omitted).
170. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 320-21 (1984).
171. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
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a share of regional waters, and that Alabama's claim will lack the
"seriousness and dignity" required to invoke the Court's jurisdiction.
Indeed, Georgia and Florida have made such accusations against the
other in their current case before the Court.17 2 The Special Master has
recently released his Report in the matter, and Florida was unable to meet
its heavy burden under the equitable apportionment doctrine.173 It is
difficult to imagine Alabama escaping unscathed from arguments critical of
its water management failures.
2. EPA Intervention
Some have also suggested that our failure to adopt serious water-policy
regulation leaves us open to an EPA effort to exert direct control over
Alabama water-resources policy.17 4 Such worries are overwrought.
It is true that EPA has regulated the flows of water into a body of water
as a means to help control water quality under the federal Clean Water
Act.'75 But EPA has not regulated the flows of streams themselves.176
While limiting flows into a stream would have some effect on the quantity
of water in that stream, such limitations are a far cry from asserting the
power to interfere with state water-resources policy. Moreover, it is unclear
that such proxy regulation is permissible under the text of the Clean Water
Act, so that even the minor effect of such regulations on state water-
resources policy may well vanish.177
172. Chapman, supra note 20 (in the current Supreme Court litigation, "Georgia's
lawyers ... have requested hydrologic flow levels of the Apalachicola River dating to 1975 in hopes of
showing Florida's poor stewardship of the river. Florida, meanwhile, seeks the number of well permits
issued to southwest Georgia farmers to prove lax regulation by Georgia").
173. This is not, however, because Florida had failed to show injury: the Master noted that "there
is little question that Florida has suffered harm from decreased flows." Report of the Special Master,
supra note 21, at 31. However, because the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers manages the Chattahoochee
River and could not be made a party to the suit, see United States' Amicus Curiae Brief in Opposition to
GA's Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 66, Florida v. Georgia, Orig. No. 142 (U.S. Mar. 11, 2015),
Florida could not show that any injury it had suffered was redressable by an order from the Court that
would not bind the Corps, Report of the Special Master, supra note 21 at 69.
174. See Hollis, supra note 22.
175. E.g., Kyle Robisch, Comment, The Future of Proxy Total Maximum Daily Loads After
Virginia Department of Transportation v. EPA, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 171 (2014) (discussing
EPA practice of implementing total maximum daily loads of pollutants in water bodies under Clean
Water Act by regulating, as a proxy for the pollutants themselves, the incoming flow of the water
containing the pollutants).
176. William L. Andreen, No Virtue Like Necessity: Dealing with Nonpoint Source Pollution and
Environmental Flows in the Face of Climate Change, 34 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255, 291 (2016) ("Although
EPA has at times encouraged states to bridge the divide between water quality and water quantity, it has
done little more than exhort states to act.").
177. The only case to address proxy TMIDLs thus far found them unlawful under the Clean
Water Act. See Va. Dep't of Transp. v. EPA, No. 1:12-CV-775, 2013 WL 11085508 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3,
2013); see also, e.g., Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 U.
COLO. L. REv. 431, 463 (2011) (noting that "the legality of impervious cover TMDLs is debatable").
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Similarly, while some have argued that EPA should take over
Alabama's water quality program, thus divesting the Alabama Department
of Environmental Management of its authority to enforce the Clean Water
Act, 17 8 EPA has expressly declined to take such action, and courts have
affirmed EPA's decision not to intervene.1 79 Indeed, EPA appears largely to
wish to help Alabama keep its water-quality authority"so Finally, the Clean
Water Act itself recognizes that states are the regulators of water
quantity.181 Indeed, Congress has reinforced that recognition through
amendments to the Act. 182 Accordingly, EPA has resisted efforts to push it
into the water-quantity arena.'8 3 There seems to be little reason to worry
that EPA will oust Alabama from its sovereign authority over its waters.
None of this detracts, however, from the serious consequences of our
failure to regulate for Supreme Court litigation, economic development,
drought management, ecosystem protection, and future growth.
III. EFFORTS TO CHANGE ALABAMA WATER LAW
Alabama's efforts to develop a statewide water policy first started in
the early 1990s, prompted by "three droughts during the 1980s, falling
groundwater levels around metropolitan areas, salwater intrusion along the
Gulf Coast, and a disagreement with the Army Corps of Engineers over
proposed increases in Georgia's withdrawal of water from the
Chattahoochee and Coosa Rivers."l 84 In 1989, Governor Guy Hunt created
the Alabama Water Resources Study Commission to study and report upon
Alabama's water issues;85 the Commission's report, Water for a Quality of
178. E.g., Raines, supra note 23; Spencer, supra note 23.
179. Kent Faulk, Appeals Court Won't Revoke ADEM Powers 16 Environmental Groups Want
State Agency Stripped ofPermitting Ability, HUNTSVILLE TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015), 2015 WLNR 36114990
("Environmental groups filed petitions asking EPA to begin the process of withdrawing ADEM's
authority to issue the permits, alleging 26 program deficiencies, according to the court opinion. EPA
responded in April 2014 with interim findings. It found 22 of the alleged deficiencies did not warrant
taking back that authority from ADEM. While EPA expressed 'significant concerns' about the other
four allegations, it deferred a decision and stated it would work with ADEM and allow the state agency
to address the concerns before deciding whether to begin the process of withdrawing permitting
authority.").
180. Id; see also EPA Region 4 Stakeholder Comments to the Alabama Water Agencies
Working Group (Nov. 2012) (expressing, for example, the regional EPA office's willingness to "work
with the AWAWG and member agencies to provide technical support of the state's efforts").
181. 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2) (2012).
182. Id. § 1251(g) (added to the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 5(a), 91 Stat.
1567, 1575).
183. Andreen, supra note 176, at 291-92.
184. Andreen, supra note 24, at AL-10. See also WATER FOR A QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 1,
at iii, 1.
185. Id. at iii.
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Life, was published in 1990.186 The Commission recommended a number of
changes to Alabama law. 87  The Alabama Legislature subsequently
enacted, and the Governor signed into law, the Alabama Water Resources
Act.188 As noted above, the Act is largely toothless.1 8 9
Given the failings with the Alabama Water Resources Act, Alabama's
water policy issues remain largely unaddressed. During the 1990s and
2000s, tensions flared between Alabama, Florida, and Georgia over their
shared water resources.190 The three states attempted to negotiate an
interstate compact to resolve competing claims to the Apalachicola-Flint-
Chattahoochee basin waters;'9' Alabama and Georgia also negotiated over
the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa waters.19 2 While compacts were created to
establish frameworks for negotiating allocation of these interstate waters,
the negotiations came to naught, and the compacts expired.19 3 Further stress
came from recurrent droughts: in the late 1990s, the state experienced a
severe drought;19 4 drought recurred in the mid-2000s.'9 ' Birmingham saw
its second-driest summer since 1900 in 2011.196
In recognition of these continuing water-policy problems, Governor
Robert Bentley convened the Alabama Water Agencies Working Group
(AWAWG) in 2011 and again in 2012.19 The AWAWG includes
representatives of OWR, the Department of Environmental Management,
the Geological Survey, the Department of Conservation and Natural
Resources, and the Department of Agriculture and Industries.98 The
AWAWG was asked to create a statewide database of water resources,
186. Id
187. Id. at 7-13.
188. Water Resources Act, No. 93-44, 1993 Ala. Laws 78 (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 9-10B-1 to
-30 (2001)).
189. See supra notes 102-114 and accompanying text.
190. E.g., Stephen E. O'Day et al., Wars Between the States in the 21st Century: Water Law in
an Era ofScarcity, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 229 (2009).
191. See generally In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2009),
rev'd and vacated sub nom. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir.
2011).
192. See id at 1335 n.16.
193. Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-105, 111 Stat. 2233
(1997); Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 Stat. 2219
(1997). The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Compact expired in 2003 when the commission created
by the Compact did not vote to extend its expiration. See 111 Stat. at 2224. The Alabama-Coosa-
Tallapoosa Compact expired in 2004 for the same reason. See 111 Stat. at 2238.
194. Dave Bryan, Recent Rains Helping, but Farmers Wary of Coming Months, MOBILE REG.,
June 6, 2001, at B12.
195. William Thornton, We're Out of the Drought. Metro-Area Rainfall Above Normal in 2008,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Dec. 19, 2008, at IA.
196. Jeff Hansen, Arid August Widens Drought, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 2, 2011, at lA.
197. ALA. WATER AGENCIES WORKING GRP., WATER MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN ALABAMA 1
(2012), http://www.adem.alabama.gov/programs/water/waterforms/WaterlssueReport.pdf.
198. MAPPING THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at 11, 110-12.
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meet with stakeholders, and recommend a statewide water-resources plan
by December 1, 2013.199
The AWAWG's report, Mapping the Future of Alabama Water
Resources Management: Policy Options and Recommendations, was issued
by the Governor in 2014.200 Rather than recommend a concrete plan, the
AWAWG instead spelled out a process by which further information could
be gathered, more stakeholders could contribute, and more options could be
considered.201 The AWAWG thus suggested a four-track process:
Technical, Focus Area Panels (FAPs), Stakeholder Outreach, and Process
Support.2 02 This process would result in an initial statewide water
management plan and, to ensure the success of that plan, an ongoing
"adaptive implementation process."203
Five FAPs were suggested by the AWAWG, charged with addressing
particular issues:
* a Riparian and Other Legal Issues FAP would address
whether current law was adequate to address Alabama's
water resource needs, and, if not, what amendments should
be made to the Alabama Water Resources Act to address
those needs;204
* a Certificates of Use, Permitting, and Interbasin Transfers
FAP would address whether OWR's current certificate-of-
use program is adequate and whether action should be
taken to allow interbasin transfers (transfers of water from
one river basin to another, something forbidden under the
common law);205
* an Instream Flows FAP would define instream flow (which
the AWAWG defined as water that must remain in a river
or stream to meet public health, economic, environmental,
and downstream needs) and suggest ways in which
Alabama law needs to be changed to accommodate such
flows; 206
199. Id.
200. Press Release, The Office of Ala. Governor Robert Bentley, Governor Bentley Releases
Alabama Water Resources Management Policy Report (Apr. 17, 2014),
http://govemor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2014/04/govemor-bentley-releases-alabama-water-resources-
management-policy-report/.
201. MAPPING THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at 25-30.
202. Id. at 25-28.
203. Id at 6.
204. Id. at 27.
205. Id. at 28.
206. Id. at v, 28.
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* a Conservation, Efficiency, and Reuse FAP would address
water conservation and reuse issues, especially with regard
to public water utilities;207 and
* a Local and Regional Planning FAP would assess the roles
of Alabama's state, regional, and local water-policy entities
under current law and suggest the optimal level of decision-
making and input for various water-policy issues.20 8
Governor Bentley created the FAPs as described in the AWAWG
report, staffing the panels with volunteers from all areas of Alabama water
policy.20 9 The FAPs met with the Governor and the AWAWG in early fall
2015 to receive their charges, all of which were in line with the AWAWG
recommendations described above.2 10 The FAPs met throughout 2016.
Stakeholder outreach also occurred: the AWAWG hosted a stakeholder
meeting on April 5, 2016, in Auburn.2 11 At the meeting, updates were
provided from the AWAWG and the various FAPs.212 As of this writing, no
reports have issued from any FAP.
Unfortunately, the AWAWG's progress so far has been slow. No
legislation has been recommended to the Governor or the legislature, and
the FAP process does not seem to have produced any concrete advances.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
A. More Study is Unnecessary
OWR is currently conducting an assessment of Alabama's surface-
water resources.2 13 The Geological Survey of Alabama is currently
conducting an assessment of Alabama's groundwater resources.214 Both
207. Id. at 27-28.
208. Id. at 27.
209. Letter from Robert Bentley, Ala. Governor, to author (July 7, 2015) (on file with author).
210. Governor Robert Bentley, Address to Focus Area Panels, Sept. 3, 2015.
211. Alabama Water Agencies Working Group, ADECA, http://adeca.alabama.gov/Divisions/
owr/awawg/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
212. Alabama Water Agencies Working Group Stakeholder Meeting, ADECA (Apr. 5, 2016),
adeca.alabama.gov/Divisions/owr/awawg/Documents/AWAWGStakeholderAgenda 20160405.pdf.
213. Marlon Cook, Groundwater Management and Policy in Alabama: How Much is Enough?,
ALA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. MGMT. (2016), http://www.adem.state.al.us/misc/gwconf2016/GWConf-
MCook.pdf.
214. Id.; Groundwater Assessment Program - Current Projects, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF ALA.,
http://www.gsa.state.al.us/gsa/groundwater/currentprojects (la t visited Feb. 11, 2017).
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assessments were expected to be completed by December 31, 2016,215 but
as of this writing have not been completed.216
Some policy makers have suggested that any policy changes should
wait for completion of the currently ongoing assessments of surface and
groundwater resources.217 And, it is true, there is information that we do
not currently have. For example, a capacity stress designation depends on
knowing what water levels a basin experiences when it is not stressed and
what levels are required for ecosystems to flourish.218 Yet Alabama does
not have sufficient data on these baseline and ecological levels, and it is
thus very difficult to ascertain when a basin moves from unstressed to
stressed levels.
But note the context in which this problem emerges: OWR needs the
data to be able to perform a capacity stress analysis. The Alabama
Legislature itself did not require that data to assign to OWR the task of
designating capacity stress areas. Likewise, our current water management
problems can be addressed legislatively without the detailed data that the
assessments will provide: the legislature need only create a statutory
framework within which an agency would operate; only that agency needs
the data to act appropriately within the statutory framework.
In an argument that does not simply counsel delay but instead argues
against any new statute, some suggest that litigation alone could achieve
the desired changes. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, for example,
states a modem common law rule of riparianism that removes the on-tract
21
limitation.219 Were Alabama courts to adopt the Restatement approach to
riparian doctrine, the argument goes, the on-tract limitation would be lifted.
A similar approach could change groundwater doctrine. It is not clear that
Alabama courts would adopt this approach, however. In addressing
questions of first impression, Alabama courts catalog the approaches taken
in other common law states and choose the majority approach.22 0 The
Restatement has not been adopted by a majority of common law
215. - Cook, supra note 213.
216. See GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF ALA., supra note 205 ("Research is currently being conducted
throughout the state to complete the statewide assessment.").
217. See MAPPING THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at 2.
218. See generally ALA. CODE §§ 9-10B-3(3), -21 (2001).
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 855 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979) ("[A] nonriparian
use that can be accommodated with riparian uses and causes no substantial harm to them can be
reasonable despite its nonriparian character.").
220. See, e.g., Wehby v. Turpin, 710 So. 2d 1243, 1246-47, 1249 (Ala. 1998) ("This issue is one
of first impression in Alabama. Therefore, we must examine the law of other jurisdictions to gain a
better understanding of the origins and evolution of littoral or riparian rights. Most jurisdictions appear
to adhere to the so-called common law rule. . . . We are bound to follow the majority common law
rule. . . .").
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jurisdictions. 221 It thus is at least possible, and may be probable, that an
Alabama court would reject the Restatement as too seldom adopted to
constitute a majority common law rule. In addition, court decision-making
in general is usually after the fact (occurring only after investments have
been made and harm suffered), ad hoc and inconsistent (resulting in
unfairness when like cases are treated as unlike), and inefficient (costing a
lot in attorney's fees and taking a long time to obtain results); litigation
around water rights specifically is highly unlikely to address the systemic
aspects of water policy, including the desirability of prioritizing some uses
over others22 2 and the need to consider instream flows and other ecosystem
needs.22 3
As explained exhaustively above, the current common law regime
cannot meet our twenty-first-century needs. Those problems are clear and
can be addressed now. Continuing to postpone action is costly, and
litigation will not solve our problems. The better approach, then, is
legislative action.
B. We Need a Comprehensive Water-Resources-Policy Statute
I have argued thoroughly in an earlier volume of this Law Review that
Alabama should adopt the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code.224 I
continue to believe that adopting such a statute is the best approach, for a
number of reasons. Without recapitulating the entire argument, I will
highlight several considerations that compel the adoption of the Code or
something very like it.
First, any legislation must recognize the hydrologic connections
between surface and groundwater, something the common law ignores.
Doing so would bring Alabama's water law "into line with contemporary
knowledge, and with scientific reality."225 Failing to do this risks failure of
regulation: if groundwater pumping affects surface flows, and surface-
water diversions affect groundwater levels, continuing to treat the two as
separate resources means that permits for surface water could allow harms
to groundwater and vice versa.226
221. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 MARQ. L.
REv. 53, 84 n.169 (2011) ("Thus far, courts in 18 reported cases have referred to the Restatement
(Second) regarding riparian rights; nearly all were general references that did not play a major role in
the decision.").
222. See supra Part II.A.3.
223. See supra note 30.
224. Heather Elliott, Alabama's Water Crisis, 63 ALA. L. REv. 383 (2012). See supra Part II.A.3.
225. Joseph L. Sax, We Don't Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6 U.
DENV. WATER L. REv. 269, 270 (2003). See supra note 30.
226. Cf, e.g., City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73 (N.M. 1963).
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Second, any legislation should simultaneously remove the traditional
on-tract and in-watershed restrictions of the common law and impose
protections for instream flow and other public considerations. Transfers
off-tract and out of watershed allow water to be used in places where it is
needed, rather than only on riparian or overlying land. And requiring the
agency to consider social and environmental issues before authorizing a
permit prevents transfers that would harm localities, economies, or
ecosystems.2 27
Third, legislation should create a permitting system under which an
agency assesses the reasonableness of a use before a permit issues, rather
than only in post hoc litigation.228 Rejecting a permitting agency means
leaving water-resource decisions to courts and thus losing investments and
productivity when existing uses are enjoined.
Relatedly, administrative permits remove some of the uncertainty
inherent in common law water-resources doctrine.229 As noted above,
common law rights are unstable, and new circumstances or new uses can
always jeopardize existing uses.2 30 But permitting systems can give
statutory priority to existing uses, thus protecting investments and
capital.231 And a new statutory scheme need not dislocate existing water
uses: Alabama could grandfather in existing uses
2 32-both those authorized
by the common law, and those currently in existence even if unlawful-to
reduce the costs of transition to the permitting system (including reducing
the risk of takings litigation233).
227. For this reason, the piecemeal approach that would be taken by current Senate Bill 255 is
unacceptable; lifting the common law's on-tract restrictions without concomitant protections for
instream flows is too dangerous. See supra note 30.
228. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Developing a Suitable Water Allocation Law for Pennsylvania, 17
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 49-50 (2006).
229. A. Dan Tarlock, Water Law Reform in West Virginia: The Broader Context, 106 W. VA. L.
REv. 495, 516-18 (2004).
230. See supra Part II.
231. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.223(1)(b) (West Supp. 2016) (requiring consumptive use permit
applicants to demonstrate, inter alia, that "the proposed use of water . .. [w]ill not interfere with any
presently existing legal use of water").
232. Id. § 6R-1-03.
233. See, e.g., In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 669 (Cal. 1979)
(interpreting state water code "as not authorizing the [state water board] to extinguish altogether 
a
future riparian right, [but permitting] the [b]oard [to] make determinations as to the scope, nature and




Alabama currently has a nineteenth-century common law system
inadequate to address twenty-first-century issues. The Code "offers a
model for the twenty-first century,"234 and it is one we should adopt.
234. Robert E. Beck, The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code: Blueprint for Twenty First
Century Water Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 113, 115 (2000).
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